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Abstract
Recent work has shown that it is possible to train deep
neural networks that are provably robust to norm-bounded
adversarial perturbations. Most of these methods are based
on minimizing an upper bound on the worst-case loss over
all possible adversarial perturbations. While these tech-
niques show promise, they often result in difficult optimiza-
tion procedures that remain hard to scale to larger networks.
Through a comprehensive analysis, we show how a simple
bounding technique, interval bound propagation (IBP), can
be exploited to train large provably robust neural networks
that beat the state-of-the-art in verified accuracy. While
the upper bound computed by IBP can be quite weak for
general networks, we demonstrate that an appropriate loss
and clever hyper-parameter schedule allow the network to
adapt such that the IBP bound is tight. This results in a
fast and stable learning algorithm that outperforms more
sophisticated methods and achieves state-of-the-art results
on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and SVHN. It also allows us to train
the largest model to be verified beyond vacuous bounds on a
downscaled version of IMAGENET.
1. Introduction
Despite the successes of deep learning [1], it is well-
known that neural networks are not robust. In particular, it
has been shown that the addition of small but carefully cho-
sen deviations to the input, called adversarial perturbations,
can cause the neural network to make incorrect predictions
with high confidence [2–6]. Starting with Szegedy et al. [6],
there has been a lot of work on understanding and generating
adversarial perturbations [3, 7], and on building models that
are robust to such perturbations [4, 8–10]. Unfortunately,
many of the defense strategies proposed in the literature are
targeted towards a specific adversary (e.g., obfuscating gra-
dients against projected gradient attacks), and as such they
are easily broken by stronger adversaries [11, 12]. Robust
Perturbation found
through exhaustive search
(via MIP solver)
Perturbation found
using PGD
Empirically robust but
not provably robust model
Predictions
2 (MIP)
8 (PGD)
Figure 1: Example motivating why robustness to the projected
gradient descent (PGD) attack is not a true measure of robustness
(even for small convolutional neural networks). Given a seemingly
robust neural network, the worst-case perturbation of size  = 0.1
found using 200 PGD iterations and 10 random restarts (shown at
the top) is correctly classified as an “eight”. However, a worst case
perturbation classified as a “two” can be found through exhaustive
search (shown at the bottom).
optimization techniques, like the one developed by Madry
et al. [9], overcome this problem by trying to find the worst-
case adversarial examples at each training step and adding
them to the training data. While the resulting models show
strong empirical evidence that they are robust against many
attacks, we cannot yet guarantee that a different adversary
(for example, one that does brute-force enumeration to com-
pute adversarial perturbations) cannot find inputs that cause
the model to predict incorrectly. In fact, Figure 1 provides
an example that motivates why projected gradient descent
(PGD) – the technique at the core of Madry et al.’s method –
does not always find the worst-case attack (a phenomenon
also observed by Tjeng et al. [13]).
This has driven the need for formal verification: a prov-
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able guarantee that neural networks are consistent with a
specification for all possible inputs to the network. Sub-
stantial progress has been made: from complete methods
that use Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) [14–16] or
Mixed-Integer Programming (MIP) [13, 17, 18] to incom-
plete methods that rely on solving a convex relaxation of
the verification problem [19–26]. Complete methods, which
provide exact robustness bounds, are expensive and difficult
to scale (since they perform exhaustive enumeration in the
worst case). Incomplete methods provide robustness bounds
that can be loose. However, they scale to larger models than
complete methods and, as such, can be used inside the train-
ing loop to build models that are not only robust, but also
intrinsically easier to verify [20, 23, 24, 27].
In this paper, we study interval bound propagation (IBP),
which is derived from interval arithmetic [14, 15, 28]: an
incomplete method for training verifiably robust classifiers.
IBP allows to define a loss to minimize an upper bound on
the maximum difference between any pair of logits when
the input can be perturbed within an `∞ norm-bounded ball.
Compared to more sophisticated approaches [20, 23, 24, 27],
IBP is very fast – its computational cost is comparable to
two forward passes through the network. This enables us
to have a much faster training step, allowing us to scale to
larger models with larger batch sizes and perform more ex-
tensive hyper-parameter search. While the core approach
behind IBP has been studied to some extent in previous
papers [20, 23], blindly using it results in a difficult opti-
mization problem with unstable performance. Most notably,
we develop a training curriculum and show that this approach
can achieve strong results, outperforming the state-of-the-art.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose several enhancements that improve the per-
formance of IBP for verified training. In particular,
we differentiate ourselves from Mirman et al. [20] by
using a different loss function, and by eliding the last
linear layer of the neural network, thereby improving
our estimate of the worst-case logits. We also develop
a curriculum that stabilizes training and improves gen-
eralization.
• We compare our trained models to those from other ap-
proaches in terms of robustness to PGD attacks [3] and
show that they are competitive against Madry et al. [9]
and Wong et al. [25] across a wide range of `∞ pertur-
bation radii (hereafter denoted by ). We also compare
IBP to Wong et al.’s method in terms of verified error
rates.
• We demonstrate that IBP is not only computationally
cheaper, but that it also achieves the state-of-the-art
verified accuracy for single-model architecture.1 We
1The use of ensembles or cascades (as done by Wong et al. [25]) is
orthogonal to the work presented here.
reduce the verified error rate from 3.67% to 2.23%
on MNIST (with `∞ perturbations of  = 0.12), from
19.32% to 8.05% on MNIST (at  = 0.3), and from
78.22% to 67.96% on CIFAR-10 (at  = 8/255). Thus,
demonstrating the extent to which the model is able to
adapt itself during training so that the simple relaxation
induced by IBP is not too weak.
• We train the first provably robust model on IMAGENET
(downscaled to 64× 64 images) at  = 1/255. Using
a WideResNet-10-10, we reach 93.87% top-1 verified
error rate. This constitutes the largest model to be
verified beyond vacuous bounds (a random or constant
classifier would achieve a 99.9% verified error rate).
• Finally, the code for training provably robust neural
networks using IBP is available at https://github.
com/deepmind/interval-bound-propagation.
2. Related Work
Work on training verifiably robust neural networks typi-
cally falls in one of two primary categories. First, there are
empirical approaches exemplified perfectly by Xiao et al.
[29]. This work takes advantage of the nature of MIP-based
verification – the critical bottleneck being the number of
integer variables the solver needs to branch over. The au-
thors design a regularizer that aims to reduce the number
of ambiguous ReLU activation units (units for which bound
propagation is not able to determine whether they are on or
off) so that verification after training using a MIP solver is
efficient. This method, while not providing any meaningful
measure of the underlying verified accuracy during training,
is able to reach state-of-the-art performance once verified
after training with a MIP solver.
Second, there are methods that compute a differentiable
upper bound on the violation of the specification to verify.
This upper bound, if fast to compute, can be used within a
loss (e.g., hinge loss) to optimize models through regular
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). In this category, we
highlight the works by Raghunathan et al. [27], Wong et al.
[25], Dvijotham et al. [23] and Mirman et al. [20]. Raghu-
nathan et al. [27] use a semi-definite relaxation that provides
an adaptive regularizer that encourages robustness. Wong
et al. [25] extend their previous work [24], which considers
the dual formulation of the underlying LP. Critically, any
feasible dual solution provides a guaranteed upper bound on
the solution of the primal problem. This allows Wong and
Kolter to fix the dual solution and focus on computing tight
activation bounds that, in turn, yield a tight upper bound on
the specification violation. Alternatively, Dvijotham et al.
[23] fix the activation bounds and optimize the dual solution
using an additional verifier network. Finally, Mirman et al.
[20] introduce geometric abstractions that bound activations
2 is measured with respect to images normalized between 0 and 1.
as they propagate through the network. To the contrary of
the conclusions from these previous works, we demonstrate
that tighter relaxations (such as the dual formulation from
Dvijotham et al. [23], or the zonotope domain from Mirman
et al. [20]) are not necessary to reach tight verified bounds.
IBP, which often leads to loose upper bounds for arbi-
trary networks, has a significant computational advantage,
since computing IBP bounds only requires two forward
passes through the network. This enables us to apply IBP to
significantly larger models and train with extensive hyper-
parameter tuning. We show that thanks to this capability, a
carefully tuned verified training process using IBP is able
to achieve state-of-the-art verified accuracy. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, our results show that neural networks can easily
adapt to make the rather loose bound provided by IBP much
tighter – this is in contrast to previous results that seemed
to indicate that more expensive verification procedures are
needed to improve the verified accuracy of neural networks
in image classification tasks.
3. Methodology
Neural network. We focus on feed-forward neural net-
works trained for classification tasks. The input to the net-
work is denoted x0 and its output is a vector of raw un-
normalized predictions (hereafter logits) corresponding to
its beliefs about which class x0 belongs to. During training,
the network is fed pairs of input x0 and correct output label
ytrue, and trained to minimize a misclassification loss, such
as cross-entropy.
For clarity of presentation, we assume that the neural
network is defined by a sequence of transformations hk for
each of its K layers. That is, for an input z0 (which we
define formally in the next paragraph), we have
zk = hk(zk−1) k = 1, . . . ,K (1)
The output zK ∈ RN has N logits corresponding to N
classes.
Verification problem. We are interested in verifying that
neural networks satisfy a specification by generating a proof
that this specification holds. We consider specifications that
require that for all inputs in some set X (x0) around x0, the
network output satisfies a linear relationship
cTzK + d ≤ 0 ∀z0 ∈ X (x0) (2)
where c and d are a vector and a scalar that may depend on
the nominal input x0 and label ytrue. As shown by Dvijotham
et al. [22], many useful verification problems fit this defini-
tion. In this paper, we focus on the robustness to adversarial
perturbations within some `∞ norm-bounded ball around the
nominal input x0.
Adversarial
polytope
Interval
bounds Specification
Upper
bound
Figure 2: Illustration of interval bound propagation. From the left,
the adversarial polytope (illustrated in 2D for clarity) of the nominal
image of a “nine” (in red) is propagated through a convolutional
network. At each layer, the polytope deforms itself until the last
layer where it takes a complicated and non-convex shape in logit
space. Interval bounds (in gray) can be propagated similarly: after
each layer the bounds are reshaped to be axis-aligned bounding
boxes that always encompass the adversarial polytope. In logit
space, it becomes easy to compute an upper bound on the worst-
case violation of the specification to verify.
A network is adversarially robust at a point x0 if there
is no choice of adversarial perturbation that changes the
classification outcome away from the true label ytrue, i.e.,
argmaxi zK,i = ytrue for all elements z0 ∈ X (x0). For-
mally, we want to verify that for each class y:
(ey−eytrue)TzK ≤ 0 ∀z0 ∈ X (x0) = {x | ‖x−x0‖∞ < }
(3)
where ei is the standard ith basis vector and  is the perturba-
tion radius.
Verifying a specification like (2) can be done by search-
ing for a counter-example that violates the specification con-
straint:
max
z0∈X (x0)
cTzK + d
subject to zk = hk(zk−1) k = 1, . . . ,K
(4)
If the optimal value of the above optimization problem is
smaller than 0, the specification (2) is satisfied.
Interval bound propagation. IBP’s goal is to find an up-
per bound on the optimal value of the problem (4). The sim-
plest approach is to bound the activation zk of each layer by
an axis-aligned bounding box (i.e., zk() ≤ zk ≤ zk() 3)
using interval arithmetic. For `∞ adversarial perturbations
of size , we have for each coordinate zk,i of zk:
zk,i() = min
zk−1()≤zk−1≤zk−1()
eTi hk(zk−1)
zk,i() = max
zk−1()≤zk−1≤zk−1()
eTi hk(zk−1)
(5)
3For simplicity, we abuse the notation ≤ to mean that all coordinates
from the left-hand side need to be smaller than the corresponding coordi-
nates from the right-hand side.
where z0() = x0 − 1 and z0() = x0 + 1. The above
optimization problems can be solved quickly and in closed
form for affine layers and monotonic activation functions.
An illustration of IBP is shown in Figure 2.
For the affine layers (e.g., fully connected layers, con-
volutions) that can be represented in the form hk(zk−1) =
Wzk−1 + b, solving the optimization problems (5) can be
done efficiently with only two matrix multiplies:
µk−1 =
zk−1 + zk−1
2
rk−1 =
zk−1 − zk−1
2
µk =Wµk−1 + b
rk = |W |rk−1
zk = µk − rk
zk = µk + rk
(6)
where | · | is the element-wise absolute value operator. Prop-
agating bounds through any element-wise monotonic acti-
vation function (e.g., ReLU, tanh, sigmoid) is trivial. Con-
cretely, if hk is an element-wise increasing function, we
have:
zk = hk(zk−1)
zk = hk(zk−1)
(7)
Notice how for element-wise non-linearities the (zk, zk)
formulation is better, while for affine transformations
(µk, rk) is more efficient (requiring two matrix multiplies
instead of four). Switching between parametrizations de-
pending on hk incurs a slight computational overhead, but
since affine layers are typically more computationally inten-
sive, the formulation (6) is worth it.
Finally, the upper and lower bounds of the output logits
zK can be used to construct an upper bound on the solution
of (4):
max
zK()≤zK≤zK()
cTzK + d (8)
Overall, the adversarial specification (3) is upper-bounded
by zK,y() − zK,ytrue(). It corresponds to an upper bound
on the worst-case logit difference between the true class ytrue
and any other class y.
Elision of the last layer. Bound propagation is not nec-
essary for the last linear layer of the network. Indeed, we
can find an upper bound to the solution of (4) that is tighter
than proposed by (8) by eliding the final linear layer with
the specification. Assuming hK(zK−1) =WzK−1 + b, we
have:
max
zK≤zK≤zK
zK=hK(zK−1)
cTzK + d
≥ max
zK−1≤zK−1≤zK−1
cThK(zK−1) + d
= max
zK−1≤zK−1≤zK−1
cTWzK−1 + cTb+ d
= max
zK−1≤zK−1≤zK−1
c′TzK−1 + d′
(9)
with c′ = W Tc and d′ = cTb + d, which bypasses the
additional relaxation induced by the last linear layer.
Loss. In the context of classification under adversarial per-
turbation, solving the optimization problem (8) for each
target class y 6= ytrue results in a set of worst-case logits
where the logit of the true class is equal to its lower bound
and the other logits are equal to their upper bound:
zˆK,y() =
{
zK,y() if y 6= ytrue
zK,ytrue() otherwise
(10)
That is for all y 6= ytrue, we have
(ey − eytrue)TzˆK() = max
zK()≤zK≤zK()
(ey − eytrue)TzK (11)
We can then formulate our training loss as
L = κ `(zK , ytrue)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lfit
+(1− κ) `(zˆK(), ytrue)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lspec
(12)
where ` is the cross-entropy loss and κ is a hyperparameter
that governs the relative weight of satisfying the specifi-
cation (Lspec) versus fitting the data (Lfit). If  = 0 then
zK = zˆK(), and thus (12) becomes equivalent to a standard
classification loss.
Training procedure. To stabilize the training process and
get a good trade-off between nominal and verified accuracy
under adversarial perturbation, we create a learning curricu-
lum by scheduling the values of κ and :
• κ controls the relative weight of satisfying the speci-
fication versus fitting the data. Hence, we found that
starting with κ = 1 and slowly reducing it throughout
training helps get more balanced models with higher
nominal accuracy. In practice, we found that using a fi-
nal value of κ = 1/2 works well on MNIST, CIFAR-10,
SVHN and IMAGENET.
• More importantly, we found that starting with  = 0
and slowly raising it up to a target perturbation radius
train is necessary. We note that train does not need to be
equal to the perturbation radius used during testing, us-
ing higher values creates robust models that generalize
better.
Additional details that relate to specific datasets are available
in the supplementary material in Appendix A.
4. Results
We demonstrate that IBP can train verifiably robust net-
works and compare its performance to state-of-the-art meth-
ods on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and SVHN. Highlights include
an improvement of the verified error rate from 3.67% to
2.23% on MNIST at  = 0.1, from 19.32% to 8.05% on
MNIST at  = 0.3, and from 78.22% to 67.96% on CIFAR-
10 at  = 8/255. We also show that IBP can scale to larger
networks by training a model on downscaled IMAGENET
that reaches a non-vacuous verified error rate of 93.87% at
 = 1/255. Finally, Section 4.3 illustrates how training with
the loss function and curriculum from Section 3 allows the
training process to adapt the model to ensure that the bound
computed by IBP is tight.
Unless stated otherwise, we compute the empirical ad-
versarial accuracy (or error rate) on the test set using 200
untargeted PGD steps and 10 random restarts. As the ver-
ified error rate computed for a network varies greatly with
the verification method, we calculate it using an exact solver.
Several previous works have shown that training a network
with a loss function derived from a specific verification pro-
cedure renders the network amenable to verification using
that specific procedure only [23, 24, 27]. In order to cir-
cumvent this issue and present a fair comparison, we use
a complete verification algorithm based on solving a MIP –
such an algorithm is expensive as it performs a brute force
enumeration in the worst case. However, in practice, we find
that commercial MIP solvers like Gurobi can handle verifica-
tion problems from moderately sized networks. In particular,
we use the MIP formulation from Tjeng et al. [13]. For each
example of the test set, a MIP is solved using Gurobi with a
timeout of 10 minutes. Upon timeout, we fallback to solv-
ing a relaxation of the verification problem with a LP [15]
using Gurobi again. When both approaches fail to provide
a solution within the imparted time, we count the example
as attackable. Thus, the verified error rate reported may be
over-estimating the exact verified error rate.4 We always
report results with respect to the complete test set of 10K
images for both MNIST and CIFAR-10, and 26K images for
SVHN. For downscaled IMAGENET, we report results on the
validation set of 10K images.
4.1. MNIST, CIFAR-10 and SVHN
We compare IBP to three alternative approaches: the nom-
inal method, which corresponds to standard training with
4As an example, for the small model trained using Wong et al., there are
3 timeouts at  = 0.1, 18 timeouts at  = 0.2 and 58 timeouts at  = 0.3
for the 10K examples of the MNIST test set. These timeouts would amount
to a maximal over-estimation of 0.03%, 0.18% and 0.58% in verified error
rate, respectively.
small medium large
CONV 16 4×4+2 CONV 32 3×3+1 CONV 64 3×3+1
CONV 32 4×4+1 CONV 32 4×4+2 CONV 64 3×3+1
FC 100 CONV 64 3×3+1 CONV 128 3×3+2
CONV 64 4×4+2 CONV 128 3×3+1
FC 512 CONV 128 3×3+1
FC 512 FC 512
# hidden: 8.3K 47K 230K
# params: 471K 1.2M 17M
Table 1: Architecture of the three models used on MNIST, CIFAR-
10 and SVHN. All layers are followed by RELU activations. The
last fully connected layer is omitted. “CONV k w×h+s” corresponds
to a 2D convolutional layer with k filters of size w×h using a stride
of s in both dimensions. “FC n” corresponds to a fully connected
layer with n outputs. The last two rows are the number of hidden
units (counting activation units only) and the number of parameters
when training on CIFAR-10.
cross-entropy loss; adversarial training, following Madry
et al. [9], which generates adversarial examples on the fly
during training; and Wong et al. [25], which trains models
that are provably robust. We train three different model ar-
chitectures for each of the four methods (see Table 1). The
first two models (i.e., small and medium) are equivalent to
the small and large models in Wong et al. [25]. 5 The third
model (i.e., large) is significantly larger (in terms of number
of hidden units) than any other verified model presented in
the literature. On MNIST, for each model and each method,
we trained models that are robust to a wide range of pertur-
bation radii by setting train to 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 or 0.4. During
testing, we test each of these 12 models against  ∈ [0, 0.45].
On CIFAR-10, we train the same models and methods with
train ∈ {2/255, 8/255} and test on the same  = train value.
On SVHN we used train = 0.01 and only test on  = train.
Figures 3a and b compare IBP to Wong et al. on MNIST
for all perturbation radii between 0 and 0.45 across all mod-
els. Remember that we trained each model architecture
against many train values. The bold lines show for each
model architecture, the model trained with the perturbation
radius train that performed best for a given  (i.e., x-axis)
The faded lines show all individual models. Across the full
spectrum, IBP achieves good accuracy under PGD attacks
and higher provable accuracy (computed by an exact veri-
fier). We observe that while Wong et al. is competitive at
small perturbation radii (when both  and train are small), it
quickly degrades as the perturbation radius increases (when
train is large). For completeness, Figure 3c also compares
IBP to Madry et al. with respect to the empirical accuracy
against PGD attacks of varying intensities. We observe that
IBP tends to be slightly worse than Madry et al. for similar
network sizes – except for the large model where Madry et al.
5We do not train our large model with Wong et al. as we could not scale
this method beyond the medium sized model.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: Accuracy against different adversarial perturbations: (a) shows the verified/provable worst-case accuracy compared to Wong et al.,
(b) shows the empirical adversarial accuracy computed by running PGD compared to Wong et al., and (c) shows the empirical adversarial
accuracy computed by running PGD compared to Madry et al.. Faded lines show individual models of a given size (i.e., small, medium and
large) trained with train = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4}, while bold lines show the best accuracy across across all train values for each model size.
In (a), for Wong et al., the dots correspond to exact bounds computed using a MIP solver, while the black bold line corresponds to a lower
bound computed using [25] without random projections.
is likely overfitting (as it performs worse than the medium-
sized model).
Table 4 provides additional results and also includes re-
sults from the literature. The test error corresponds to the
test set error rate when there is no adversarial perturbation.
For models that we trained ourselves, the PGD error rate
is calculated using 200 iterations of PGD and 10 random
restarts. The verified bound on the error rate is obtained
using the MIP/LP cascade described earlier. A dash is used
to indicate when we could not verify models beyond trivial
bounds within the imparted time limits. For such cases, it is
useful to consider the PGD error rate as a lower bound on the
verified error rate. All methods use the same model architec-
tures (except results from the literature). For clarity, we do
not report the results for all train values and all model archi-
tectures (Table 6 in the appendix reports additional results).
Figure 3 already shows the effect of train and model size in
a condensed form. Compared to Wong et al., IBP achieves
lower error rates under normal and adversarial conditions, as
well as better verifiable bounds, setting the state-of-the-art
in verified robustness to `∞-bounded adversarial attacks on
most pairs of dataset and perturbation radius. Additionally,
IBP remains competitive against Madry et al. by achieving a
lower PGD error rate on CIFAR-10 with  = 8/255 (albeit
at the cost of an increased nominal error rate).6 CIFAR-10
with  = 2/255 is the only combination where IBP is worse
than Wong et al. [25]. From our experience, the method from
Wong et al. is more effective when the perturbation radius
is small (as visible on Figure 3a), thus giving a marginally
6This result only holds for our constrained set of network sizes. The
best known empirical adversarial error rate for CIFAR-10 at  = 8/255
using Madry et al. is 52.96% when using 20 PGD steps and no restarts.
As a comparison, our large model on CIFAR-10 achieves an empirical
adversarial error rate of 60.1% when using 20 PGD steps and no restarts.
 Method Test error PGD Verified
1/255
Nominal 48.84% 100.00% –
Madry et al. 51.52% 70.03% –
IBP 84.04% 90.88% 93.87%
Table 2: Downscaled IMAGENET results. Comparison of the
nominal test error (under no perturbation), empirical PGD error
rate, and verified bound on the error rate. The verified error rate is
computed using IBP bounds only, as running a complete solver is
too slow for this model.
better feedback when training on CIFAR-10 at  = 2/255.
Additional results are available in Appendix D. Appendix C
also details an ablative study that demonstrates that (i) using
cross-entropy (rather than a hinge or softplus loss on each
specification) improves verified accuracy across all datasets
and model sizes, that (ii) eliding the last linear layer also
provides a small but consistent improvement (especially for
models with limited capacity), and that (iii) the schedule on
 is necessary.
Finally, we note that when training the small network on
MNIST with a Titan Xp GPU (where standard training takes
1.5 seconds per epoch), IBP only takes 3.5 seconds per epoch
compared to 8.5 seconds for Madry et al. and 2 minutes for
Wong et al. (using random projection of 50 dimensions).
Indeed, as detailed in Section 3 (under the paragraph interval
bound propagation), IBP creates only two additional passes
through the network compared to Madry et al. for which we
used seven PGD steps.
4.2. Downscaled IMAGENET
This section demonstrates the scalability of IBP by train-
ing, to the best of our knowledge, the first model with
non-vacuous verifiable bounds on IMAGENET. We train
(a) Training step 0 (b) Training step 200 (c) Training step 800
Figure 4: Evolution of the adversarial polytope (in gray) around the same input during training. The outer approximation computed using
IBP is shown in green.
a WideResNet-10-10 with 8M parameters and 1.8M hidden
units, almost an order of magnitude greater than the number
of hidden units in our large network. The results in Table 2
are obtained through standard non-robust training, adversar-
ial training, and robust training using IBP on downscaled
images (i.e., 64× 64). We use all 1000 classes and measure
robustness (either empirical or verifiably) using the same
one-vs-all scheme used for MNIST, CIFAR-10 and SVHN.
Additional details are available in the supplementary mate-
rial in Appendix A. We realize that these results are pale
in comparison to the nominal accuracy obtained by larger
non-robust models (i.e., Real et al. [30] achieving 16.1%
top-1 error rate). However, we emphasize that no other work
has formally demonstrated robustness to norm-bounded per-
turbation on IMAGENET, even for small perturbations like
 = 1/255.
4.3. Tightness
Figure 4 shows the evolution of an adversarial polytope
and its outer approximation during training. In this setup
(similar to Wong and Kolter [24]), we train a 2-100-100-
100-2 network composed of fully-connected layers with
ReLU activations on a toy two-dimensional dataset. This
dataset consists of 13 randomly drawn 2-dimensional points
in [0, 1]2, five of which are from the positive class. The `∞
distance between each pair of points is at least 0.08, which
corresponds to the  and train values used during testing
and training, respectively. The adversarial polytope at the
last layer (shown in gray) is computed by densely sampling
inputs within an `∞-norm bounded ball around a nominal
input (corresponding to one of the positive training exam-
ples). The outer bounds (in green) correspond to the interval
bounds at the last layer computed using (5). We observe that,
while initially the bounds are very loose, they do become
tighter as training progresses.
To judge the tightness of IBP quantitatively, we compare
the final verified error rate obtained using the MIP/LP cas-
cade describe earlier with the upper bound estimates from
Dataset Epsilon IBP bound MIP bound
MNIST
 = 0.1 2.92% 2.23%
 = 0.2 4.53% 4.48%
 = 0.3 8.21% 8.05%
 = 0.4 15.01% 14.88%
CIFAR-10  = 2/255 55.88% 49.98%
 = 8/255 68.44% 67.96%
SVHN  = 0.01 39.35% 37.60%
Table 3: Tightness of IBP verified bounds on the error rate.
This table compares the verified bound on the error rate obtained
using the MIP/LP cascade with the estimates from IBP only (ob-
tained using the worst-case logits from (10)). The models are the
ones reported in Table 4.
IBP only. Table 3 shows the differences. We observe that
IBP itself is a good estimate of the verified error rate and pro-
vides estimates that are competitive with more sophisticated
solvers (when models are trained using IBP). While intuitive,
it is surprising to see that the IBP bounds are so close to
the MIP bounds. This highlights that verification becomes
easier when models are trained to be verifiable as a simple
method like IBP can verify a large proportion of the MIP
verified samples. This phenomenon was already observed
by Dvijotham et al. [23] and Xiao et al. [29] and explains
why some methods cannot be verified beyond trivial bounds
within a reasonable computational budget.
5. Conclusion
We have presented an approach for training verifiable
models and provided strong baseline results for MNIST,
CIFAR-10, SVHN and downscaled IMAGENET. Our experi-
ments have shown that the proposed approach outperforms
competing techniques in terms of verified bounds on adver-
sarial error rates in image classification problems, while also
training faster. In the future, we hope that these results can
serve as a useful baseline. We believe that this is an impor-
tant step towards the vision of specification-driven ML.
Dataset Epsilon Method Test error PGD Verified
MNIST  = 0.1
Nominal 0.65% 27.72% –
Madry et al. (train = 0.2) 0.59% 1.34% –
Wong et al. (train = 0.1) 1.08% 2.89% 3.01%
IBP (train = 0.2) 1.06% 2.11% 2.23%
Reported in literature*
Xiao et al. [29]** 1.05% 3.42% 4.40%
Wong et al. [25] 1.08% – 3.67%
Dvijotham et al. [23] 1.20% 2.87% 4.44%
MNIST  = 0.2
Nominal 0.65% 99.57% –
Madry et al. (train = 0.4) 0.70% 2.39% –
Wong et al. (train = 0.2) 3.22% 6.93% 7.27%
IBP (train = 0.4) 1.66% 3.90% 4.48%
Reported in literature
Xiao et al. [29] 1.90% 6.86% 10.21%
MNIST  = 0.3
Nominal 0.65% 99.63% –
Madry et al. (train = 0.4) 0.70% 3.73% –
Wong et al. (train = 0.3) 13.52% 26.16% 26.92%
IBP (train = 0.4) 1.66% 6.12% 8.05%
Reported in literature
Madry et al. [9] 1.20% 6.96% –
Xiao et al. [29] 2.67% 7.95% 19.32%
Wong et al. [25] 14.87% – 43.10%
MNIST  = 0.4
Nominal 0.65% 99.64% –
Madry et al. (train = 0.4) 0.70% 5.52% –
IBP (train = 0.4) 1.66% 10.34% 14.88%
CIFAR-10  = 2/255
Nominal 16.66% 87.24% –
Madry et al. (train = 2/255) 15.54% 42.01% –
Wong et al. (train = 2/255) 36.01% 45.11% 49.96%
IBP (train = 2/255) 29.84% 45.09% 49.98%
Reported in literature
Xiao et al. [29] 38.88% 50.08% 54.07%
Wong et al. [25] 31.72% – 46.11%
CIFAR-10  = 8/255
Nominal 16.66% 100.00% 100.00%
Madry et al. (train = 8/255) 20.33% 75.95% –
Wong et al. (train = 8/255) 71.03% 78.14% 79.21%
IBP (train = 8/255) 50.51% 65.23% 67.96%
Reported in literature
Madry et al. [9] 12.70% 52.96% –
Xiao et al. [29] 59.55% 73.22% 79.73%
Wong et al. [25] 71.33% – 78.22%
Dvijotham et al. [23]*** 51.36% 67.28% 73.33%
SVHN  = 0.01
Nominal 5.13% 94.14% –
Madry et al. (train = 0.01) 6.18% 29.06% –
Wong et al. (train = 0.01) 18.10% 32.41% 37.96%
IBP (train = 0.01) 14.82% 32.46% 37.60%
Reported in literature
Wong and Kolter [24] 20.38% 33.74% 40.67%
Dvijotham et al. [23] 16.59% 33.14% 37.56%
Table 4: Comparison with the state-of-the-art. Comparison of the nominal test error (no adversarial perturbation), error rate under PGD
attacks, and verified bound on the error rate. The PGD error rate is calculated using 200 iterations of PGD and 10 random restarts. Dashes
“–” indicate that we were unable to verify these networks beyond the trivial 100% error rate bound within the imparted time limit; for such
cases we know that the verified error rate must be at least as large as the PGD error rate. For the models we trained ourselves, we indicate
the train that lead to the lowest verified (or – when not available – empirical) error rate. Results from Mirman et al. [20] are only included in
Appendix D as, due to differences in image normalization, different  were used; we confirmed with the authors that our IBP results are
significantly better.
* Results reported from the literature may use different network architectures. Their empirical PGD error rate may have been computed with
a different number of PGD steps and a different number of restarts (when possible we chose the closest setting to ours). Except for the
results from Xiao et al. [29], the reported verified bound on the error rate is not computed with an exact solver and may be over-estimated.
** For this model, Xiao et al. [29] only provides estimates computed from 1000 samples (rather than the full 10K images).
*** Dvijotham et al. [23] use a slightly smaller  = 0.03 = 7.65/255 for CIFAR-10.
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Scalable Verified Training for Provably Robust Image Classification
(Supplementary Material)
A. Training parameters
For IBP, across all datasets, the networks were trained using the Adam [31] algorithm with an initial learning rate of 10−3.
We linearly ramp-down the value of κ between 1 and κfinal after a fixed warm-up period (κfinal is set to both 0 or 0.5 and the
best result is used). Simultaneously, we lineary ramp-up the value of  between 0 and train (for CIFAR-10 and SVHN, we
use a value of train that is 10% higher than the desired robustness radius). MNIST is trained on a single Nvidia V100 GPU.
CIFAR-10, SVHN and IMAGENET are trained on 32 tensor processing units (TPU) [32] with 2 workers with 16 TPU cores
each.
• For MNIST, we train on a single Nvidia V100 GPU for 100 epochs with batch sizes of 100. The total number of training
steps is 60K. We decay the learning rate by 10× at steps 15K and 25K. We use warm-up and ramp-up durations of 2K
and 10K steps, respectively. We do not use any data augmentation techniques and use full 28× 28 images without any
normalization.
• CIFAR-10, we train for 3200 epochs with batch sizes of 1600 (training for 350 epochs with batch sizes of 50 reaches
71.70% verified error rate when  = 8/255). The total number of training steps is 100K. We decay the learning rate by
10× at steps 60K and 90K. We use warm-up and ramp-up durations of 5K and 50K steps, respectively. During training,
we add random translations and flips, and normalize each image channel (using the channel statistics from the train set).
• For SVHN, we train for 2200 epochs with batch sizes of 50 (training for 240 epochs with batch sizes of 50 reaches
within 1% of the verified error rate). The total number of training steps is 100K. The rest of the schedule is identical to
CIFAR-10. During training, we add random translations, and normalize each image channel (using the channel statistics
from the train set).
• For IMAGENET, we train for 160 epochs with batch sizes of 1024. The total number of training steps is 200K. We decay
the learning rate by 10× at steps 120K and 180K. We use warm-up and ramp-up durations of 10K and 100K steps,
respectively. We use images downscaled to 64× 64 (resampled using pixel area relation, which gives moire´-free images).
During training, we use random crops of 56× 56 and random flips. During testing, we use a central 56× 56 crop. We
also normalize each image channel (using the channel statistics from the train set).
The networks trained using Wong et al. [25] were trained using the schedule and learning rate proposed by the authors. For
Madry et al. [9], we used a learning rate schedule identical to IBP and, for the inner optimization, adversarial examples are
generated by 7 steps of PGD with Adam [31] and a learning rate of 10−1. Note that our reported results for these two methods
closely match or beat published results, giving us confidence that we performed a fair comparison.
Figure 5 shows how the empirical PGD accuracy (on the test set) increases as training progresses for IBP and Madry et al..
This plot shows the median performance (along with the 25th and 75th percentiles across 10 independent training processes)
and confirms that IBP is stable and produces consistent results. Additionally, for IBP, we clearly see the effect of ramping the
value of  up during training (which happens between steps 2K and 12K).
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Figure 5: Median evolution of the nominal (no attacks) and empirical PGD accuracy (under perturbations of  = 0.3) as training progresses
for 10 independently trained large models on MNIST. The shaded areas indicate the 25th and 75th percentiles.
B. Convolutional filters
Figure 6 shows the first layer convolutional filters resulting from training a small robust model on MNIST against a
perturbation radius of  = 0.1. Overall, the filters tend to be extremely sparse – at least when compared to the filters obtained
by training a nominal non-robust model (this observation is consistent with [25]). We can qualitatively observe that Wong et al.
produces the sparsest set of filters.
Similarly, as shown in Figure 7, robust models trained on CIFAR-10 exhibit high levels of sparsity in their convolutional
filters. Madry et al. seems to produce more meaningful filters, but they remain sparse compared to the non-robust model.
This analysis suggests that IBP strongly limits the capacity of the underlying network. As a consequence, larger models are
often preferable. Larger models, however, can lead to the explosion of intermediate interval bounds – and this is the main
reason why values of  must be carefully scheduled. Techniques that combine tighter (but slower) relaxations with IBP could
be used in the initial training stages when training deeper and wider models.
(a) Nominal (b) IBP
(c) Wong et al. (d) Madry et al.
Figure 6: First layer convolutional filters resulting from training a small robust model on MNIST against a perturbation radius of  = 0.1 for
all methods.
(a) Nominal (b) IBP
(c) Wong et al. (d) Madry et al.
Figure 7: First layer convolutional filters resulting from training a small robust model on CIFAR-10 against a perturbation radius of
 = 2/255 for all methods.
C. Ablation study
Table 5 reports the performance of each model for different training methods on MNIST with  = 0.4 (averaged over 10
independent training processes). We chose MNIST for ease of experimentation and a large perturbation radius to stress the
limit of IBP. The table shows the effect of the elision of the last layer and the cross-entropy loss independently. We do not
report results without the schedule on  as all models without the schedule are unable to train (i.e., reaching only 11.35%
accuracy at best).
We observe that all components contribute to obtaining a good final verified error rate. This is particularly visible for the
small model, where adding elision improves the bound by 3.88% (12.9% relative improvement) when using a softplus loss.
Using cross-entropy (instead of softplus) also results in a significant improvement of 4.42% (14.7% relative improvement).
Ultimately, the combination of cross-entropy and elision shows an improvement of 5.15%. Although present for larger models,
these improvements are less visible. This is another example of how models with larger capacity are able to adapt to get tight
bounds. Finally, it is worth noting that elision tends to provide results that are more consistent (as shown by the 25th and 75th
percentiles).
D. Additional results
Table 6 provides complementary results to the ones in Table 4. It includes results for each individual model architecture,
as well as results from the literature (for matching model architectures). The test error corresponds to the test set error rate
when there is no adversarial perturbation. For models that we trained ourselves, the PGD error rate is calculated using 200
iterations of PGD and 10 random restarts. The verified bound on the error rate is obtained using the MIP/LP cascade described
in Section 4.
We observe that with the exception of CIFAR-10 with  = 2/255, IBP outperforms all other models by a significant margin
(even for equivalent model sizes). For CIFAR-10 with  = 2/255, it was important to increase the model size to obtain
competitive results. However, since IBP is cheap to run (i.e., only two additional passes), we can afford to run it on much
larger models.
E. Runtime
When training the small network on MNIST with a Titan Xp GPU (where standard training takes 1.5 seconds per epoch),
IBP only takes 3.5 seconds per epoch compared to 8.5 seconds for Madry et al. and 2 minutes for Wong et al. (using random
projection of 50 dimensions). Indeed, as detailed in Section 3 (under the paragraph “interval bound propagation”), IBP creates
only two additional passes through the network compared to Madry et al. for which we used seven PGD steps during training.
Xiao et al.’s method takes the same amount of time as IBP as it needs to perform bound propagation too.
Model Training method IBP verified boundmedian (0.5) 0.25 0.75
small
+ -schedule 30.09% 28.63% 32.03%
+ elision 26.21% 24.99% 28.49%
+ cross-entropy 25.67% 24.04% 26.71%
+ elision 24.94% 23.10% 26.63%
medium
+ -schedule 20.24% 19.77% 20.66%
+ elision 19.96% 19.92% 20.19%
+ cross-entropy 18.10% 17.60% 18.38%
+ elision 18.02% 17.61% 18.11%
large
+ -schedule 18.32% 17.88% 18.55%
+ elision 18.03% 17.93% 18.58%
+ cross-entropy 16.39% 15.73% 17.11%
+ elision 16.33% 16.00% 16.74%
Table 5: Ablation study. This table compares the median verified bound on the error rate (obtained using IBP) for different training methods
on MNIST with  = 0.4. The reported IBP verified error bound is an upper bound of the true verified error rate; it is computed using the
elision of the last layer. The different training methods include combining the linear schedule on train (as explained in Appendix A) with the
elision of the last layer or the cross-entropy loss (the cross-entropy loss is replaced with a softplus loss otherwise, as done by Mirman et al.
[20] and Dvijotham et al. [23]). We do not report results without the -schedule as all models without the schedule are unable to train (i.e.,
reaching only 11.35% accuracy at best).
Dataset Epsilon Method Test error PGD Verified
MNIST  = 0.1
IBP (small) 1.39% 2.91% 2.97%
IBP (medium) 1.06% 2.11% 2.23%
IBP (large) 1.07% 1.89% 2.32%
Reported in literature
Wong et al. [25] (small) 1.26% – 4.48%
Wong et al. [25] (medium) 1.08% – 3.67%
Mirman et al. [20]* (small) 2.4% 4.4% 5.8%
Mirman et al. [20] (medium) 1.0% 2.4% 3.4%
Wang et al. [33]** (small) 1.5% 3.7% 8.4%
Wang et al. [33] (medium) 0.5% 1.8% 4.8%
MNIST  = 0.3
IBP (small) 4.59% 9.09% 10.25%
IBP (medium) 2.70% 7.98% 9.74%
IBP (large) 1.66% 6.12% 8.05%
Reported in literature
Wong et al. [25] (small) 14.87% – 43.10%
Wong et al. [25] (medium) 12.61% – 45.66%
Mirman et al. [20] (small) 3.2% 9.0% 19.4%
Mirman et al. [20] (medium) 3.4% 6.2% 18.0%
Wang et al. [33] (small) 4.6% 12.7% 48%
Wang et al. [33] (medium) 3.4% 10.6% 41.6%
CIFAR-10  ≈ 1/510***
Reported in literature
Mirman et al. [20]*** (small) 42.8% 46.4% 47.8%
Mirman et al. [20] (medium) 52.8% 59.2% 64.2%
CIFAR-10  ≈ 2/255***(*)
IBP (small) 39.54% 53.95% 56.43%
IBP (medium) 37.28% 51.73% 54.78%
IBP (large) 29.84% 45.09% 49.98%
Reported in literature
Wong et al. [25] (small) 38.91% – 52.75%
Wong et al. [25] (medium) 31.28% – 46.59%
Mirman et al. [20]*** (small) 45.8% 60.0% 64.8%
Mirman et al. [20] (medium) 51.6% 61.4% 75.8%
Wang et al. [33]**** (small) 28.9% 45.4% 62.4%
Wang et al. [33] (medium) 22.1% 36.5% 58.4%
CIFAR-10  = 8/255
IBP (small) 61.63% 70.42% 72.93%
IBP (medium) 58.23% 69.72% 72.33%
IBP (large) 50.51% 65.23% 67.96%
Reported in literature
Wong et al. [25] (small) 72.24% – 79.25%
Wong et al. [25] (medium) 80.56% – 83.43%
Table 6: Additional comparison with the state-of-the-art. Comparison of the nominal test error (no adversarial perturbation), error rate
under PGD attacks, and verified bound on the error rate. For IBP models, the PGD error rate is calculated using 200 iterations of PGD
and 10 random restarts. For reported results, we report the closest setting to ours. We indicate in parenthesis the model architecture:
for Wong et al. [25] small and medium are equivalent to “Small” and “Large”; for Mirman et al. [20] they are equivalent to the best of
“ConvSmall/ConvMed” and best of “ConvBig/ConvSuper”; for Wang et al. [33] they are equivalent to “Small” and “Large” (we always
report the best verified result when different verification methods are used). We indicate in bold the best results per model architecture.
* Mirman et al. [20] report results on 500 samples for both MNIST and CIFAR-10 (instead of the 10K samples in test set).
** The number of samples used in Wang et al. [33] is unknown.
*** We confirmed with Mirman et al. that [20] uses a perturbation radius of 0.007 post-normalization, it is roughly equivalent to 1/510
pre-normalization. Similarly they use a perturbation radius of 0.03 post-normalization, it is roughly equivalent to 2/255 pre-normalization.
**** We confirmed with Wang et al. that [33] use a perturbation radius of 0.0348 post-normalization, it is roughly equivalent to 2/255
pre-normalization.
F. When Projected Gradient Descent is not enough
For a given example in MNIST, this section compares the worst-case attack found by PGD with the one found using a
complete solver. The underlying model is a medium sized network trained using IBP with  = 0.1. The nominal image, visible
in Figure 8a, has the label “eight”, and corresponds to the 1365th image of the test set.
The worst-case perturbation of size  = 0.1 found using 200 PGD iterations and 10 random restarts is shown in Figure 8b.
In this particular case, the robust network is still able to successfully classify the attack as an “eight”. Without any verifiable
proof, we could wrongly assume that our network is robust to `∞ perturbation on that image. However, when running a
complete solver (using a MIP formulation), we are able to find a counter-example that successfully induces the model to
misclassify the “eight” as a “two” (as shown in Figure 8c).
Label: 8 - Prediction: 8 - Adversarial: 8
(a) Nominal image correctly
classified as an “eight”
Label: 8 - Prediction: 8 - Adversarial: 8
(b) Worst attack found using PGD still classified
as an “eight”
Label: 8 - Prediction: 8 - Secondary: 2
(c) Actual worst attack found using a MIP solver
incorrectly classified as a “two”
Figure 8: Attacks of size  = 0.1 found on the 1365th image of the MNIST test set. For (b) and (c), the left pane shows the adversarial image,
while the right pane shows the perturbation rescaled for clarity.
Figure 9 shows the untargeted adversarial loss (optimized by PGD) around the nominal image. In these loss landscapes, we
vary the input along a linear space defined by the worse perturbations found by PGD and the MIP solver. The u and v axes
represent the magnitude of the perturbation added in each of these directions respectively and the z axis represents the loss.
Typical cases where PGD is not optimal are often a combination of two factors that are qualitatively visible in this figure:
• We can observe that the MIP attack only exists in a corner of the projected `∞-bounded ball around the nominal image.
Indeed, since PGD is a gradient-based method, it relies on taking gradient steps of a given magnitude (that depends on
the learning rate) at each iteration. That is, unless we allow the learning rate to decay to a sufficiently small value, the
reprojection on the norm-bounded ball at each iteration will force the PGD solution to bounce between the edges of that
ball without hitting its corner.
• The second, more subtle, effect concerns the gradient direction. Figure 9b, which shows a top-view of the loss landscape,
indicates that a large portion of `∞ ball around the nominal image pushes the PGD solution towards the right (rather than
the bottom). In other words, gradients cannot always be trusted to point towards the true worst-case attack.
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Figure 9: Loss landscapes around the nominal image of an “eight”. It is generated by varying the input to the model, starting from the
original input image toward either the worst attack found using PGD (u direction) or the one found using a complete solver (v direction).
In (a), the z axis represents the loss and the orange and blue colors on the surface represent the classification predicted by the model. We
observe that while the PGD attack (blue dot) is correctly classified as an “eight”, the MIP attack (red dot) is misclassified as a “two”.
Panel (b) shows a top-view of the same landscape with the decision boundary in black. For both panels, the diamond-shape represents the
projected `∞ ball of size  = 0.1 around the nominal image.
